The Rules

Last general cause of our errors

We have spoken thus far of errors for which some occasional cause can be assigned in the nature of the pure understanding, or of the mind considered as acting by itself; and in the nature of ideas, that is to say, in the manner in which the mind perceives external objects. It remains now only to explain a cause that may be called universal and general of all our errors, because one conceives no error that does not depend upon it in some way. This cause is that, since nothingness has no ideas to represent it, the mind is inclined to believe that things of which it has no idea do not exist.

It is certain that the general source of our errors, as we have already said several times, is that our judgments have more scope than our perceptions; for when we consider some object, we ordinarily view it only from one side; and we are not content to judge of the side we have considered, but we judge of the whole object. Thus it often happens that we are mistaken, because although the thing is true on the side we have examined, it is ordinarily found false on the other; and what we believe to be true is only probable. Now it is visible that we would not judge absolutely of things as we do, if we did not think we had considered all their sides, or if we did not suppose them to be similar to the one we have examined. Thus the general cause of our errors is that, having no ideas of the other sides of our object or of their difference from the one present to our mind, we believe that these other sides do not exist, or at least we suppose that they have no particular difference.

This way of acting seems to us quite reasonable; for since nothingness forms no ideas in the mind, one has some reason to believe that things which form no idea in the mind at the time one examines them resemble nothingness. And what confirms us in this sentiment is that we are persuaded by a kind of instinct that the ideas of things are due to our nature, and that they are so subject to the mind that they must present themselves to it as soon as it wishes.

The ideas of things are not always present to the mind as soon as one wishes.

However, if we reflected somewhat upon the present state of our nature, we would not have so great a tendency to believe that we have all the ideas of things as soon as we want them. Man, so to speak, is only flesh and blood since the Fall. The least impression of his senses and passions breaks the strongest attention of his mind, and the current of animal spirits and blood carries it along and continually drives it toward sensible objects. It is often in vain that he stiffens himself against this torrent that sweeps him away, and it is rarely that he thinks to resist it; for there is too much sweetness in following it and too much fatigue in opposing it. The mind therefore becomes discouraged and dejected as soon as it has made some effort to seize itself and to fix itself upon some truth; and it is absolutely false, in the state in which we are, that the ideas of things are present to our mind whenever we wish to consider them. Thus we should not judge that things do not exist, simply because we have no idea of them.

Every finite mind is subject to error, and why

But even if we supposed man to be absolute master of his mind and his ideas, he would still be necessarily subject to error by his nature; for the mind of man is limited, and every limited mind is by its nature subject to error. The reason is that the smallest things have an infinity of relations among themselves, and an infinite mind is needed to comprehend them. Thus a limited mind, being unable to embrace or comprehend all these relations, no matter what effort it makes, is inclined to believe that those it does not perceive do not exist, principally when it pays no attention to the weakness and limitation of its own mind, which is very common for it. Thus the limitation of the mind alone carries with it the capacity to fall into error.

Nevertheless, if men, even in the state of weakness and corruption in which they are, always made good use of their freedom, they would never be mistaken. And it is for this reason that every man who falls into error is justly blamed and even deserves to be punished; for it suffices, in order not to be mistaken, to judge only of what one sees, and never to make complete judgments except about things that one is assured of having examined in all their parts, which men can do. But they prefer to subject themselves to error rather than to subject themselves to the rule of truth; they wish to decide without effort and without examination. Thus one should not be surprised if they fall into an infinite number of errors and if they often make quite uncertain judgments.

One should not judge that there are only bodies or minds, nor that God is a spirit as we conceive spirits

Men, for example, have no other ideas of substance than that of mind and body, that is to say, of a substance that thinks and of an extended substance. And from this they claim to have the right to conclude that everything that exists is body or mind. It is not that I pretend to assert that there is any substance that is neither body nor mind; for one should not assert that things exist when one has no knowledge of them; since it seems that God, who does not hide his works from us, would have given us some idea of them. However, I believe that one should determine nothing concerning the number of kinds of beings that God has created, based on the ideas one has of them, since it is absolutely possible that God has reasons for hiding them from us that we do not know; if only because these beings, having no relation to us, it would be quite useless for us to know them: just as he has not given us eyes good enough to count the teeth of a mite, because it is quite useless for the preservation of our body that we should have such penetrating sight.

But although one thinks one should not judge precipitously that all beings are minds or bodies; one nevertheless believes that it is altogether contrary to reason for philosophers, in order to explain natural effects, to use ideas other than those that depend on thought and extension, since in fact these are the only ones we have that are distinct or particular.

There is nothing so unreasonable as to imagine an infinity of beings based on mere logical ideas, to attribute to them an infinity of properties, and thus to wish to explain things one does not understand by things that one not only does not conceive, but that it is not even possible to conceive. It is to act like blind men who, wishing to speak among themselves of colors and to defend theses about them, would use for that purpose the definitions that philosophers give them, from which they would draw several conclusions. For just as blind men could make only amusing and ridiculous reasonings about colors, because they would have no distinct ideas of them, and would wish to reason about them using general and logical ideas; thus philosophers cannot make solid reasonings about the effects of nature when they use only the general and logical ideas of act, potency, being, cause, principle, form, quality, and others similar. It is absolutely necessary that they rely only on the distinct or particular ideas of thought and extension, and on those they contain or that can be deduced from them. For one should not expect to know nature without considering the distinct ideas one has of it; it is better not to meditate at all than to meditate upon chimeras.

One should not, however, assert that there are only minds and bodies, beings that think and extended beings, because one might be mistaken. For although they suffice to explain nature, and consequently one can conclude, without fear of being mistaken, that natural things of which we have some knowledge depend upon extension and thought; nevertheless it is absolutely possible that there are some others of which we have no idea and whose effects we do not see.

Men therefore make a precipitate judgment when they judge as an indubitable principle that every substance is body or mind. But they also make a precipitate conclusion when they conclude by the sole light of reason that God is a spirit. It is true that since we are created in his image and likeness, and Holy Scripture teaches us in several places that God is a spirit, we ought to believe it and call him so: but reason alone cannot teach us this. It only tells us that God is an infinitely perfect being, and that he must be rather spirit than body, since our soul is more perfect than our body; but it does not assure us that there are not still beings more perfect than our minds, and more above our minds than our minds are above our bodies.

Supposing that there were such beings, as even reason seems to make indubitable that God could have created them, it is clear that they would resemble God more than we. Thus the same reason teaches us that God would have their perfections rather than ours, which would be only imperfections compared to them. We must not therefore imagine precipitously that the word “spirit,” which we use to express what God is and what we are, is a univocal term, signifying the same things or things very similar. God is more above created spirits than these spirits are above bodies; and one should not so much call God a spirit to show positively what he is, as to signify that he is not material. He is an infinitely perfect being, one cannot doubt it. But just as one should not imagine, with the anthropomorphites, that he must have the human form, because it appears the most perfect, even if we supposed him corporeal; so also one should not think that the spirit of God has human thoughts, and that his spirit is similar to ours, because we know nothing more perfect than our spirit. One should rather believe that, just as he contains in himself the perfections of matter without being material, since it is certain that matter has relation to some perfection that is in God; so he also comprehends the perfections of created spirits without being spirit in the manner in which we conceive spirits; that his true name is HE WHO IS, that is to say, being without restriction, all being, infinite and universal being.