The Rules

The intimate presence of the vague idea of being in general is the cause of all the disorderly abstractions of the mind and of most of the chimeras of ordinary philosophy, which prevent many philosophers from recognizing the solidity of the true principles of physics.

This clear, intimate, necessary presence of God—I mean of being without particular restriction, of infinite being, of being in general—to the human mind, acts upon it more strongly than the presence of all finite objects. It is impossible for it to entirely divest itself of this general idea of being, because it cannot subsist outside of God. Perhaps one might say that it can distance itself from it, because it can think of particular beings; but one would be mistaken; for when the mind considers some particular being, it is not so much that it distances itself from God as rather that it draws nearer—if one may speak thus—to some one of His perfections representative of that being, while distancing itself from all the others. Nevertheless, it distances itself from them in such a way that it does not entirely lose sight of them, and it is almost always in a position to go seek them out and draw near to them. They are always present to the mind, but the mind perceives them only in an inexplicable confusion, because of its smallness and the grandeur of the idea of being. One may well be some time without thinking of oneself; but it seems to me that one cannot subsist a moment without thinking of being; and at the very time one thinks one is thinking of nothing, one is necessarily full of the vague and general idea of being; but because things that are quite ordinary to us and that do not affect us do not awaken the mind with any force and do not oblige it to reflect upon them, this idea of being—however great, vast, real, and positive it may be—is so familiar to us and affects us so little that we almost believe we do not see it, that we do not reflect upon it, that we subsequently judge it to have little reality, and that it is formed only from the confused assemblage of all particular ideas; although, on the contrary, it is in it alone and through it alone that we apprehend all particular beings.

Although this idea, which we receive through the immediate union we have with the Word of God, the sovereign reason, never deceives us by itself, as do those we receive because of the union we have with our body, which represent things to us otherwise than they are; nevertheless, I do not fear to say that we make such bad use of the best things that the ineffaceable presence of this idea is one of the principal causes of all the disorderly abstractions of the mind, and consequently of all that abstract and chimerical philosophy which explains all natural effects by general terms such as act, potency, cause, effect, substantial forms, faculties, occult qualities, etc. For it is certain that all these terms and several others awaken no other ideas in the mind than vague and general ideas—that is to say, those ideas that present themselves to the mind of their own accord, without effort and without application on our part.

Let one read with all possible attention all the definitions and all the explanations that are given of substantial forms, let one seek carefully in what consists the essence of all those entities that philosophers imagine as they please, and in such great number that they are obliged to make several divisions and subdivisions of them, and I am sure that one will never awaken in one’s mind any other idea of all these things than that of being and of cause in general. For this is what ordinarily happens to philosophers. They see some new effect; they immediately imagine a new entity to produce it. Fire heats; there is therefore in fire some entity that produces this effect, which is different from the matter of which fire is composed. And because fire is capable of several different effects, such as separating bodies, reducing them to ash and glass, drying them, hardening them, softening them, expanding them, purifying them, illuminating them, etc., they liberally give to fire as many faculties or real qualities as it is capable of producing different effects. But if one reflects upon all the definitions they give of these faculties, one will recognize that they are only definitions of logic and that they awaken no other ideas than that of being and of cause in general, which the mind relates to the effect produced; so that one is none the wiser for having studied them thoroughly. For all that one gets from this sort of study is that one imagines one knows better than others what, however, one knows much less; not only because one admits several entities that never existed, but also because, being prejudiced, one renders oneself incapable of conceiving how it can come about that matter all by itself—such as that of fire—being moved against bodies differently disposed, produces in them all the different effects that we see fire produce.

It is manifest to all those who have read even a little that almost all books of science, and principally those that treat of physics, medicine, chemistry, and all the particular things of nature, are full of reasonings founded on elemental qualities and on secondary qualities, such as attractive, retentive, concoctive, expulsive, and other similar ones, on others they call occult, on specific virtues, and on several other entities that men compose from the general idea of being and from that of the cause of the effect they see. This seems able to happen only because of the ease they have in considering the idea of being in general, which is always present to their mind by the intimate presence of Him who contains all beings. If ordinary philosophers were content to give their physics simply as a logic that would furnish proper terms for speaking of natural things, and if they left in peace those who attach to these terms distinct and particular ideas in order to make themselves understood, there would be nothing to criticize in their conduct. But they themselves pretend to explain nature by their general and abstract ideas, as if nature were abstract; and they absolutely want the physics of their master Aristotle to be a true physics that explains the substance of things, and not simply a logic, although it contains nothing tolerable except some definitions so vague and some terms so general that they can serve in all sorts of philosophy. They are finally so strongly infatuated with all these imaginary entities and these vague and indeterminate ideas that are naturally born in their minds, that they are incapable of stopping long enough to consider the real ideas of things in order to recognize their solidity and evidence. And this is what causes the extreme ignorance in which they are of the true principles of physics. Some proof of this must be given.

Example concerning the essence of matter.

Philosophers agree fairly well that one should regard as the essence of a thing that which is recognized first in that thing, that which is inseparable from it, and upon which depend all the properties that belong to it. So that to discover in what the essence of matter consists, one must look at all the properties that belong to it or that are contained in the idea one has of it, such as hardness, softness, fluidity, motion, rest, figure, divisibility, impenetrability, and extension, and consider first which of all these attributes is inseparable from it. Thus, fluidity, hardness, softness, motion, and rest being separable from matter, since there are several bodies that are without hardness, or without fluidity, or without softness, that are not in motion, or finally that are not at rest, it clearly follows that all these attributes are not essential to it.

But there remain four others that we conceive to be inseparable from matter, namely: figure, divisibility, impenetrability, and extension. So that to see which attribute one should take for the essence, one must no longer think of separating them, but only examine which is the first, and which presupposes no other. One easily recognizes that figure, divisibility, and impenetrability presuppose extension, and that extension presupposes nothing; but that as soon as it is given, divisibility, impenetrability, and figure are given. Thus, one must conclude that extension is the essence of matter, supposing that it has only the attributes of which we have just spoken or others similar; and I do not believe that there is anyone in the world who can doubt this after having seriously thought about it. But the difficulty is to know whether matter does not still have some other attributes different from extension and from those that depend on it; so that extension itself would not be essential to it, and it would presuppose something that is its subject and principle.

Several persons, after having very attentively considered the idea they had of matter, by all the attributes that are known of it, after having also meditated on the effects of nature as much as the force and capacity of the mind can permit, have firmly persuaded themselves that extension presupposes no thing in matter, either because they had no distinct and particular idea of this pretended thing that precedes extension, or also because they saw no effect that proves it. For just as to persuade oneself that a watch has no entity different from the matter of which it is composed, it suffices to know how the different arrangement of the wheels can produce all the movements of a watch, and to have besides no distinct idea of what could be the cause of these movements, although one has several logical ones; thus, because these persons have no distinct idea of what could be in matter, if extension were removed from it, that they see no attribute that makes it known, that extension being given, all the attributes that one conceives to belong to matter are given, and that matter is the cause of no effect that one cannot conceive that extension diversely configured and diversely agitated could not produce, they have thereby persuaded themselves that extension was the essence of matter.

But just as men have no certain demonstration that there is no intelligence or some newly created entity in the wheels of a watch; thus no one can, without a particular revelation, affirm as a geometrical demonstration that there is only extension diversely configured in a stone. For it is absolutely possible that extension is joined with some other thing that we do not conceive, because we have no idea of it, although it seems very unreasonable to believe it and to affirm it, since it is against reason to affirm what one does not know and what one does not conceive.

Nevertheless, even if one supposed that there were something other than extension in matter, that would not prevent, if one pays close attention, extension from being its essence, according to the definition just given of this word. For in short, it is absolutely necessary that everything there is in the world be either a being, or the manner of a being; an attentive mind cannot deny it. Now, extension is not the manner of a being, therefore it is a being. But, since matter is not a compound of several beings, like man, who is composed of body and mind; since matter is only a single being, it is manifest that matter is nothing other than extension.

To prove now that extension is not the manner of a being, but that it is truly a being, one must remark that one cannot conceive the manner of a being without conceiving at the same time the being of which it is the manner. One cannot conceive roundness, for example, without conceiving extension, because the manner of a being being only the being itself in such a way, the roundness, for example, of wax being only the wax itself in such a way, it is visible that one cannot conceive the manner without the being. If therefore extension were the manner of a being, one could not conceive extension without that being of which extension would be the manner. However, one conceives it quite easily all by itself. Therefore it is not the manner of any being, and consequently it is itself a being. Thus it constitutes the essence of matter, since matter is only a being and not a compound of several beings, as we have just said. But several philosophers are so accustomed to general ideas and entities of logic that their mind is more occupied with them than with those that are particular, distinct, and physical. This appears enough from the fact that the reasonings they make upon natural things are supported only by notions of logic, of act and potency, and by an infinite number of imaginary entities that they do not discern from those that are real. These persons therefore, finding a marvelous facility in seeing in their own way what they please to see, imagine that they have better sight than others, and that they distinctly see that extension presupposes something, and that it is only a property of matter, of which it can even be stripped.

Nevertheless, if one asks them to explain this thing, which they pretend to perceive in matter beyond extension; they do it in several ways that all show that they have no other idea of it than that of being or of substance in general. This appears clearly when one notices that this idea contains no particular attributes that belong to matter. For if one removes extension from matter, one removes all the attributes and all the properties that one conceives distinctly to belong to it, even if one leaves this thing they imagine to be its essence; it is visible that one could not make of it a heaven, an earth, nor anything of what we see. And on the contrary, if one removes what they imagine to be the essence of matter, provided one leaves extension, one leaves all the attributes and all the properties that one conceives distinctly to be contained in the idea of matter; for it is certain that one can form with extension alone a heaven, an earth, and the whole world we see, and still an infinity of others. Thus, this something they suppose beyond extension, having no attributes that one conceives distinctly to belong to it, and that are clearly contained in the idea one has of it, is nothing real if one believes reason, and indeed can serve no purpose in explaining natural effects. And what is said, that it is the subject and principle of extension, is said gratis, and without one conceiving distinctly what one says, that is to say without one having any other idea of it than a general and logical one, such as subject and principle. So that one could still imagine a new subject and a new principle of this subject of extension, and so on to infinity, because the mind represents to itself general ideas of subject and principle as it pleases.

It is true that it is very likely that men would not have so obscured the idea they have of matter, if they had not had some reasons for it, and that several maintain opinions contrary to these from principles of theology. No doubt extension is not the essence of matter; if that is contrary to faith, one subscribes to it. One is, thanks be to God, very persuaded of the weakness and limitation of the human mind. One knows that it has too little scope to measure an infinite power, that God can do infinitely more than we can conceive, that He gives us ideas only to know the things that happen by the order of nature, and that He conceals the rest from us. One is therefore always ready to submit the mind to faith; but other proofs are needed than those ordinarily brought forward to ruin the reasons just given, because the ways in which the mysteries of faith are explained are not of faith, and one believes them even without understanding that one could ever clearly explain the manner of them.

One believes, for example, the mystery of the Trinity, although the human mind cannot conceive it; and one nevertheless believes that two things that do not differ from a third do not differ from each other, although this proposition seems to destroy it. For one is persuaded that one should make use of one’s mind only on subjects proportionate to its capacity, and that one should not gaze fixedly at our mysteries, lest one be dazzled by them, according to this warning of the Holy Spirit: “He who is a searcher of majesty shall be oppressed by glory.”

If, however, one believed it appropriate for the satisfaction of some minds to explain how the view one has of matter agrees with what the law teaches us about Transubstantiation, one would perhaps do so in a manner clear and distinct enough, and which certainly would not conflict in any way with the decisions of the Church; but one believes oneself able to dispense with giving this explanation, principally in this work. For one must remark that the holy fathers have almost always spoken of this mystery as an incomprehensible mystery, that they have not philosophized to explain it, and that they have ordinarily contented themselves with rather inexact comparisons, more proper for making the dogma known than for giving an explanation that would satisfy the mind; that thus tradition is for those who do not philosophize upon this mystery and who submit their mind to faith, without uselessly entangling themselves in these very difficult questions.

One would therefore be wrong to ask philosophers to give clear and easy explanations of the manner in which the body of Jesus Christ is in the Eucharist; for that would be to ask them to say novelties in theology. And if the philosophers imprudently responded to this request, it seems they could not avoid the condemnation either of their philosophy or of their theology; for if their explanations were obscure, the principles of their philosophy would be despised; and if their answer were clear or easy, perhaps the novelty of their theology would be feared.

Since, therefore, novelty in matters of theology bears the mark of error, and one has the right to despise opinions for that sole reason that they are new and without foundation in tradition, one should not undertake to give easy and intelligible explanations of things that the fathers and councils have not fully explained; and it suffices to hold the dogma of transubstantiation without wishing to explain the manner of it; for otherwise it would be to sow new seeds of disputes and quarrels of which there are already too many, and the enemies of truth would not fail to use them maliciously to oppress their adversaries.

Disputes in matters of theological explanations seem to be among the most useless and dangerous, and they are all the more to be feared, because even pious persons often imagine that they have the right to break charity with those who do not share their sentiments. One has only too many experiences of this and the cause is not very hidden. Thus it is always best and safest not to be in a hurry to speak of things of which one has no evidence and which others are not disposed to conceive.

Neither should obscure and uncertain explanations of the mysteries of faith, which one is not obliged to believe, serve us as a rule and as principles for reasoning in philosophy, where only evidence ought to persuade us. We must not change the clear and distinct ideas of extension, figure, and local motion for those general and confused ideas of principle or subject of extension, form, quiddities, real qualities, and all those motions of generation, corruption, alteration, and others similar that differ from local motion. Real ideas will produce a real science; but general and logical ideas will never produce anything but a vague, superficial, and sterile science. One must therefore consider with sufficient attention these distinct and particular ideas of things, in order to recognize the properties they contain, and thus study nature, instead of losing oneself in chimeras that exist only in the reason of some philosophers.