One must not dwell on sensible manners

Our senses do not deceive us only regarding their own objects, such as light, colors, and other sensible qualities; they even seduce us concerning objects that are not within their domain, by preventing us from considering them with enough attention to form a solid judgment. This deserves to be well explained.

Our senses lead us into error even in things that are not sensible

The attention and application of the mind to the clear and distinct ideas we have of objects is the most necessary thing in the world for discovering what they truly are. For just as it is impossible to see the beauty of some work without opening one’s eyes and looking at it fixedly, so the mind cannot evidently see most things with the relationships they have to one another if it does not consider them with attention. Now, it is certain that nothing diverts us more from attention to clear and distinct ideas than our own senses; and consequently, nothing distances us more from truth, nor throws us so quickly into error.

To conceive this truth well, it is absolutely necessary to know that the three ways in which the soul perceives—namely, through the senses, through the imagination, and through the mind—do not all affect it equally, and that consequently it does not bring equal attention to everything it perceives by their means; for it applies itself greatly to what affects it much, and it is little attentive to what affects it little.

Now, what it perceives through the senses affects and engages it extremely; what it knows through the imagination affects it much less; but what the understanding represents to it—I mean what it perceives by itself or independently of the senses and the imagination—hardly rouses it at all. No one can doubt that the slightest pain of the senses is more present to the mind and makes it more attentive than the meditation on a matter of much greater consequence.

The reason for this is that the senses represent objects as present, whereas the imagination represents them only as absent. Now, it is fitting that, among several goods or several evils proposed to the soul, those that are present affect and engage it more than others that are absent, because it is necessary that the soul determine promptly what it must do in that encounter. Thus, it applies itself much more to a simple prick than to very elevated speculations, and the pleasures and pains of this world make even more impression on it than the terrible pains and infinite pleasures of eternity.

The senses therefore engage the soul extremely with what they represent to it. Now, since the soul is limited and cannot clearly conceive many things at once, it cannot clearly perceive what the understanding represents to it at the same time that the senses offer something for consideration. It therefore leaves aside the clear and distinct ideas of the understanding, which are nevertheless proper for discovering the truth of things in themselves; and it applies itself uniquely to the confused ideas of the senses, which affect it greatly, and which do not represent things according to what they are in themselves, but only according to the relationship they have with its body.

Example drawn from human conversation

If a person, for example, wishes to explain some truth, it is necessary that they use speech, and express their inner movements and sentiments through sensible movements and manners. Now, the soul cannot distinctly perceive several things at the same time. Thus, always having great attention to what comes to it through the senses, it hardly considers the reasons it hears spoken. But it applies itself much to the sensible pleasure it derives from the measure of periods, the correspondence of gestures with words, the agreeableness of the face, finally, the air and manner of the speaker. However, after having listened, it wishes to judge; such is the custom. Thus, its judgments must differ according to the diversity of impressions it has received through the senses.

If, for example, the speaker expresses himself with ease, if he keeps an agreeable measure in his periods, if he has the air of an honest man and a man of wit, if he is a person of quality, if he is followed by a large retinue, if he speaks with authority and gravity, if others listen to him with respect and silence; if he has some reputation and some commerce with minds of the first order; finally, if he is lucky enough to please or to be esteemed, he will be right in all he advances, and there will not be even his collar and his cuffs that do not prove something.

But if he is unlucky enough to have qualities contrary to these, he may demonstrate as he pleases, he will never prove anything; let him say the most beautiful things in the world, they will never be perceived. The attention of the listeners being only on what touches the senses, the disgust they feel at seeing a man so poorly composed will occupy them entirely and prevent the application they should have to his thoughts. This dirty and crumpled collar will cause contempt for the wearer and for everything that may come from him; and this way of speaking like a philosopher and a dreamer will cause those high and sublime truths, of which the common world is not capable, to be treated as reveries and extravagances.

Such are the judgments of men. Their eyes and ears judge of truth, and not reason, even in things that depend only on reason, because men apply themselves only to sensible and agreeable manners, and they almost never bring a strong and serious attention to discover the truth.

One must not dwell on sensible manners

What, however, is more unjust than to judge things by their manner, and to despise truth because it is not clothed in ornaments that please us and flatter our senses? It should be shameful for philosophers and for persons who pride themselves on wit to seek with more care these agreeable manners than truth itself, and to feed the mind rather on the vanity of words than on the solidity of things. It is for the common run of men, for souls of flesh and blood, to be won over by well-measured periods and by figures and movements that awaken the passions.

Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur, amantque, Inversis quæ sub verbis latitantia cernunt; Veraque constituunt, quæ belle tangere possunt Aures, et lepido quæ sunt fucata sonore.

(For fools admire and love all things more, Which they see hidden under inverted words; And they establish as true what can beautifully touch The ears, and what is painted with a charming sound.)

But wise persons strive to defend themselves against the malignant force and powerful charms of these sensible manners. The senses impose on them as well as on other men, since indeed they are men; but they despise the reports they make to them. They imitate that famous example of the judges of the Areopagus, who rigorously forbade their advocates to use those deceptive words and figures; and who listened to them only in darkness, lest the agreeableness of their words and gestures persuade them of something against truth and justice, and so that they might apply themselves more to considering the solidity of their reasons.